Standardizing Disparate Impact: How Ricci Circumvents Title VII and Why Congress Should Amend it Now by Pakpour, Brian
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 52 | Number 3 Article 12
9-21-2012
Standardizing Disparate Impact: How Ricci
Circumvents Title VII and Why Congress Should
Amend it Now
Brian Pakpour
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Brian Pakpour, Comment, Standardizing Disparate Impact: How Ricci Circumvents Title VII and Why Congress Should Amend it Now, 52
Santa Clara L. Rev. 1111 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss3/12
PAKPOUR FINAL 9/5/2012 10:42:32 AM 
 
1111 
STANDARDIZING DISPARATE IMPACT: HOW 
RICCI CIRCUMVENTS TITLE VII AND WHY 
CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND IT NOW 
Brian Pakpour* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 
I.   Background of Title VII 
A. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1972 
B. Court Develops the Griggs Standard 
C. EEOC Publishes Uniform Guidelines for 
Employers 
D. Wards Cove: Court Moves in a New Direction 
E. Congress Responds: The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 
II.  The Racially Disparate Impact of Standardized 
Exams 
III.  Background of Ricci v. DeStefano 
A. The Dispute 
B. Administering the Exam 
C. New Haven Assesses the Results 
D. District Court Grants Summary Judgment for 
City 
E. Second Circuit Affirms District Court Decision 
IV.  Supreme Court: Employer’s Good Faith Belief it 
Would Suffer Litigious Consequences Not Enough 
to Justify Tossing Test Results for All 
A. Reverses District Court Holding for City 
B. Reintroduces the Strong Basis in Evidence 
Standard 
V.  Problem: Refusing to Appreciate the Disparate 
Effects of Standardized Testing Exacerbates the 
Consequences 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law, 2012.  I would 
like to thank the Santa Clara Law Review Board of Editors and Associates for 
their contributions to my Comment.  I would also like to thank Professor 
Margalynne J. Armstrong for her advice and support of my research.  Finally, I 
want to express my sincere appreciation to my wife Nazzy and daughter Layla 
for their enduring love and encouragement. 
PAKPOUR FINAL 9/5/2012  10:42:32 AM 
1112 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
VI.  Why Whites Outperform Minorities on 
Standardized Tests and How Alternatives Can 
Avoid the Problem 
A. Reasons for the Racial Disparity of Exam 
Results 
B. Assessment Centers as an Alternative 
Approach 
VII.  Proposal: Congress Should Amend Title VII 
A. Certifying the Results 
B. A Presumption of Discrimination 
C. Responsibility to Utilize Reasonable 
Alternatives 
Conclusion 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress extended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 
1972, barring public employers from discriminating against 
employees and potential employees.1  At the time, it noted a 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) report that singled 
out police and fire departments for imposing barriers greater 
than any other area of state or local government.2  Blacks 
held almost no positions in the officer ranks.3 
The fire department in New Haven, Connecticut, 
exemplified the report’s concerns.4  New Haven staffed one 
black lieutenant out of sixty-one, and not a single black 
captain or higher officer.5  The Firebird Society of New 
 
 1. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 80 
Stat. 662 (amending Title VII § 701(a) to include “governments, governmental 
agencies, [and] political subdivisions”) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a) (2010)). 
 2. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 16 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2137, 2153, 1971 WL 11301 (“The problem of employment discrimination is 
particularly acute and has the most deleterious effect in these governmental 
activities which are most visible to the minority communities (notably 
education, law enforcement, and administration of justice) with the result that 
the credibility of the government’s claim to represent all the people equally is 
negated.”).  The original Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed disparate 
treatment—workplace discrimination on the basis of an individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.  See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. 88-352, 
78 Stat. 241, § 703(k) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 
(2010)). 
 3. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 16 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2137, 2153, 1971 WL 11301. 
 4. See Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2691 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 5. Firebird Soc. of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 66 
F.R.D. 457, 460 (D. Conn. 1975). 
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Haven, an organization composed of all the black firemen in 
the department, filed a civil rights action in 1973 challenging, 
among other things, written examinations with a racially 
disproportionate impact.6  The city eventually settled with the 
firefighters, agreeing to take corrective measures designed to 
ameliorate the disparate impact of its hiring practices.7  And 
Congress in 1991 codified “disparate impact” as an explicit 
claim under Title VII section 703.8 
Thirty years after Firebird, the situation in New Haven 
had changed, but not extensively.9  So when the city 
discovered that its 2003 promotional exam would promote no 
black applicants, it refused to certify the results.10  This 
meant the city would deny promotions to the white 
firefighters who passed the exam.  Certain white firefighters 
responded in 2004 by suing the city, claiming that steps 
taken by the department to prevent further discriminatory 
effects of its selection procedures resulted in reverse 
discrimination.11  In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
with them in Ricci v. DeStefano, granting the seventeen white 
firefighters (and one Hispanic) summary judgment.12  The 
Court held that New Haven should have certified results of 
the standardized promotional exam, regardless of its racially 
disparate impact.13  Throwing out the results would be 
justified only where the city had a “strong basis in evidence” 
it would lose against a hypothetical claim of such impact.14 
Pre-employment and promotional testing shapes the way 
American employers hire and promote “qualified, successful, 
and performance-driven employees.”15  But study after study 
 
 6. Id. at 459. 
 7. See id. at 463. 
 8. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat 1071, 
1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010)). 
 9. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Despite 
blacks and Hispanics comprising 60% of the city’s population in 2003, they 
made up only 18% of the officer ranks.  Id.  Further, only one out of twenty-one 
captains was black.  Id. 
 10. See id. at 2664 (majority opinion). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2681. 
 13. See id. at 2677. 
 14. See id. (“The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners 
do not dispute that the [city] was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-
impact liability.”). 
 15. Martin Carrigan, Pre-Employment Testing – Prediction of Employee 
Success and Legal Issues: A Revisitation of Griggs v. Duke Power, 5 J. BUS. & 
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demonstrates that minorities in general, and blacks in 
particular, perform measurably worse on these exams than 
their white peers.16  Therefore, closing any racial divide in 
employment existing today requires either new testing 
procedures, modified analysis of the tests already in use, or 
throwing out standardized tests altogether, since enforcing 
results posing a racially disparate impact exacerbates the 
racial divide.17 
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have ruled out 
tests that result in a racially disparate effect.  For example, a 
unanimous Supreme Court ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
against the use of tests “neutral on their face, and even 
neutral in terms of intent,” if they operate to freeze the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.18  When 
the Court subsequently lowered this standard in Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio,19 Congress reacted by passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, instructing the Court in so many words 
that it preferred the use of the Griggs standard when 
adjudicating Title VII cases.20  Commentators already accept 
the Ricci decision as another swipe by the Court at Title VII 
disparate impact, foreshadowing the day when the Court may 
ultimately rule it unconstitutional.21  Justice Scalia hinted as 
much in his short concurrence to the Ricci opinion.22  That is 
 
ECON. RES. 35, 42 (2007). 
 16. See Paul Sackett, et al., High-Stakes Testing in Higher Education and 
Employment, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 215, 222 (2008). 
 17. See infra Part VI.A. 
 18. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971). 
 19. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659–60 (1989) 
(lowering the standards of review for such employment practices); see also infra 
Part I.D. 
 20. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat 1071, 
1071 (1991) (“The purposes of this Act . . . [include] codify[ing] the concepts . . . 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs [] . . . and in the other Supreme 
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove . . . .”). 
 21. See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1341, 1342–43 (2010) (pointing out that, while the Court dodged a bullet by 
deciding the case on statutory rather than equal protection grounds, that 
gesture merely concealed the deeper issue: whether Title VII’s disparate impact 
doctrine can be consistent with equal protection in the wake of the Court’s 
previous decisions). 
 22. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681–82 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion but write separately to observe that its 
resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will 
have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-
impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the 
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why Congress needs to act. 
Congress should amend Title VII, making it an unlawful 
employment practice to certify the results of tests causing 
disparate impacts when those results reasonably follow from 
the discriminatory effects of the creation or administration of 
the exams, or the employer is aware, or should be aware, of a 
reasonable alternative to the tests that produce fewer 
disparate results.23 
Part I of this Comment will introduce the background of 
Title VII, its previous amendments, and the Court’s 
application of it.24  Part II will describe the racial disparity of 
employment test results.25  Part III will brief the facts of 
Ricci, with special emphasis on the New Haven Fire 
Department’s promotional exams, as well as the district 
court’s holding for the city and the Second Circuit’s 
affirmance.26  Part IV will assess the Supreme Court’s holding 
of the case, with attention paid to the credence given the 
disparate impact of the promotional exams.27  Part V will 
describe the precise problem that results from the Supreme 
Court’s rationale applied to pre-employment testing, and the 
consequences of Congressional inaction.28  Part VI will 
summarize the research demonstrating the traditional 
adverse impact of employment exams on ethnic minorities, 
the primary causes of these results, and one widely accepted 
alternative.29  Finally, Part VII identifies a legislative 
amendment to Title VII that will hopefully save disparate 
impact from a Supreme Court motivated to circumvent the 
Civil Rights Act by forcing employers to accept results of 
facially neutral, yet racially discriminatory employment 
tests.30 
 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”). 
 23. See infra Part V (explaining the proposed statutory amendment). 
 24. See infra Part I. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See infra Part V. 
 29. See infra Part VI. 
 30. See infra Part VII. 
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I. BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII 
A. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1972 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, ratified in 1964, 
prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire or 
discharging individuals because of their race.31  Congress 
extended this “disparate treatment” provision of Title VII in 
1972 to cover public employment.32  At the time, municipal 
fire departments across the country pervasively discriminated 
against minorities.33  Moreover, a U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights (USCCR) report singled out police and fire 
departments for imposing barriers greater than any other 
area of state or local government, with blacks holding almost 
no positions in the officer ranks.34  While overt racism was 
partly to blame, so too was reliance on criteria unrelated to 
job performance when making hiring and promotion 
decisions.35   
B.  Court Develops the Griggs36 Standard 
The Supreme Court considered the intention of Congress 
when passing the Civil Rights Act to be clear from the “plain 
language of the statute,”37 unanimously holding in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. that Duke Power’s standardized employment 
tests did not comport with Congress’ “inescapable” intent that 
standardized exams be job related.38  Therefore, an employer 
 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2010).  Specifically, the statute makes it illegal 
to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin,” or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”  See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1–2), 78 
Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2010)). 
 32. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 80 
Stat. 662 (amending § 701(a) to include “governments, governmental agencies, 
[and] political subdivisions”) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2010)). 
 33. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 2690–91; see also supra note 3. 
 35. Id. at 2690. 
 36. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 37. Id. at 429. 
 38. Id. at 436 
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could not give those tests “controlling force” over its hiring 
and promoting decisions without violating Title VII.39  
Plaintiffs had challenged Duke Power’s company policy that 
applicants for positions other than those in the labor 
department be high school graduates and score satisfactorily 
on two professionally prepared aptitude tests.40  Neither test 
measured the ability to learn to perform a particular job or 
category of jobs.41  At the time, evidence demonstrated that 
blacks performed far worse on these exams than whites.42  
Further, the 1960 census results showed that, while 34% of 
white males had completed high school, only 12% of blacks 
had in North Carolina, where Duke Power was located.43 
While each individual took the same test for the same 
job, the Court understood Title VII as proscribing “not only 
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, 
but discriminatory in operation.”44  The “touchstone” of this 
analysis is “business necessity.”45  In other words, Title VII 
prohibits any employment practice operating to exclude 
minorities, unless employers demonstrate it relates to job 
performance.46 
Clarifying the Griggs standard, the Court in Albermarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody ruled that Title VII forbids the use of 
employment tests that are discriminatory in effect unless the 
employer shows that any given requirement signifies a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question.47  Once 
the employer does this, the complaining party can still prevail 
by showing that other tests or selection devices would also 
serve the employer’s legitimate interest in “efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship,” yet without the undesirable 
racial effect.48 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 427–28. 
 41. Id. at 428. 
 42. Id. at 430. 
 43. Id. at 426, 430 n.6. 
 44. Id. at 431. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 431. 
 47. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
 48. Id. at 425; see also McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
801–02 (1973) (establishing the burden shifting framework for discrimination 
cases). 
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C.  EEOC Publishes Uniform Guidelines for Employers 
Following the direction of Congress and the Court, the 
five government agencies having the primary responsibility 
for enforcing federal employment laws like Title VII, 
including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), issued the “Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures,”49 which became effective on September 
25, 1978.50  The agencies adopted the guidelines to provide a 
uniform set of principles governing use of employee selection 
procedures “consistent with applicable legal standards.”51  
The guidelines stand for the principle “adopted by the 
Supreme Court” in Griggs and ratified by Congress in the 
1972 amendment to Title VII that, “a selection process which 
has an adverse impact on the employment opportunities of 
members of a race . . . and thus disproportionately screens 
them out is unlawfully discriminatory.”52 
The Uniform Guidelines harmonize the use of 
standardized testing with the goals of Title VII.53  For 
example, under the Guidelines, “any selection procedure 
which has an adverse impact on the hiring, promotion, or 
other employment or membership opportunities of members 
of any race . . . will be considered to be discriminatory and 
inconsistent with” the guidelines, save for some exceptions.54  
In addition, where two or more selection procedures are 
available which serve the employer’s legitimate interest and 
are substantially equally valid for a given purpose, the 
employer “should use the procedure which has been 
demonstrated to have the lesser adverse impact.”55  Finally, 
whenever the employer is made aware that an alternative 
selection procedure with evidence of less adverse impact and 
 
 49. Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common 
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 
Fed. Reg. 11,996 (Mar. 2, 1979) [hereinafter Q&A]; see also Uniform Guidelines 
on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (2010).  The Office of 
Personnel Management, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, and 
Department of Treasury made up the rest of the agencies responsible for 
enforcing employment laws.  See Q&A, 44 Fed. Reg. at 11,996. 
 50. Q&A, supra note 49, at 11,996. 
 51. Q&A, supra note 49, at 11,997. 
 52. Q&A, supra note 49, at 11,997 (emphasis added). 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
 54. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(A). 
 55. Id. § 1607.3(B). 
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substantial evidence of validity for the same job in similar 
circumstances exists, it should investigate it to determine the 
appropriateness of using it.56 
D.  Wards Cove:57 Court Moves in a New Direction 
Despite the obvious direction in which Congress aimed, 
the Court moved in an entirely different one in Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, ruling by a five-to-four majority to alter 
some of the standards established by Griggs.58  Whereas, 
before, employers had the burden of persuading the court that 
a practice that disproportionately excluded members of a 
minority group was a business necessity,59 the Wards Cove 
Court ruled employers had merely the burden of production.60  
Also, rather than demonstrating that the challenged practice 
had a “manifest relationship to the employment in 
question,”61 Wards Cove permits such practices so long as 
they serve “in a significant way, the legitimate employment 
goals of the employer.”62  Further, the touchstone of the 
inquiry was no longer business necessity,63 but “a reasoned 
review of the employer’s justification for his use of the 
challenged practice.”64  The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 
decision for the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the 
District Court for a ruling based on its new standard.65 
E. Congress Responds: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Congress responded to the Wards Cove decision almost 
immediately, passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to “improve 
Federal civil rights laws,” and “to clarify provisions regarding 
disparate impact actions,” among other purposes.66  Finding 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 58. See id. at 650 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Griggs 
standard). 
 59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 60. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659–60. 
 61. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 62. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. 
 63. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added). 
 64. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. at 661.  See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., CS-74-145-JLQ, 
1991 WL 67529 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 1991) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 10 
F.3d 1485–86 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 66. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat 1071, 
1071 (1991) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010)). 
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that Wards Cove “has weakened the scope and effectiveness of 
Federal civil rights protections,”67 Congress aimed to “codify 
the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ ”  
enunciated by the Court in Griggs “and in the other Supreme 
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove.”68  To that end, Congress 
added “disparate impact” as an explicit claim under Title VII 
section 703.69  Under the new law, plaintiffs may show 
discrimination by demonstrating an employer utilizes a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate 
impact and is unrelated to the position in question.70 
Additionally, a plaintiff can show disparate impact by 
demonstrating an alternative employment practice the 
employer refuses to adopt.71  Such demonstration shall be in 
accordance with the law “as it existed on June 4, 1989,” the 
day before the Wards Cove decision.72  The obvious intent of 
Congress therefore was to make perfectly clear its preference 
for the Griggs approach to Title VII claims over that of Wards 
Cove. 
One intention of Congress that the Court understood, 
even before the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, was 
that employers should proactively take measures to comply 
with the statute.73  The Uniform Guidelines set forth by the 
EEOC explicitly state that, “Congress strongly encouraged 
employers . . . to act on a voluntary basis to modify 
 
 67. See id. § 2. 
 68. See id. § 3. 
 69. See id. § 105; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2010) (emphasis added).  Specifically, the 
statute says, “An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this subchapter only if . . . a complaining party demonstrates 
that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a 
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and 
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”  Id. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2010). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2010).  The Court decided Wards Cove on 
June 5, 1989.  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 73. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 
478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986) (“We have on numerous occasions recognized that 
Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving 
the objectives of Title VII.”); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–
418 (1975) (quoting United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 
(8th Cir. 1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers “to self-
examine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to 
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious 
page in this country’s history.”). 
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employment practices and systems which constituted barriers 
to equal employment opportunity, without awaiting litigation 
or formal government action.”74  For example, when the Santa 
Clara County Transit District Board of Supervisors adopted a 
hiring plan that authorized managers to consider as one 
factor the sex of a qualified applicant in making promotions 
to positions within a traditionally segregated job classification 
in which women had been significantly underrepresented,75 
the Court upheld the plan.76 
As a result of employers taking proactive steps to avoid 
disparate impact claims, the number of so-called reverse 
discrimination suits has risen.77  But federal trial and 
appellate courts have dealt with such suits by upholding the 
purpose of Title VII.78  For example, White and Latino 
applicants to the police department brought a Title VII class 
action lawsuit against the County of Nassau in New York 
State for redesigning its entrance exam to minimize the 
discriminatory impact on minority candidates.79  The Second 
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim 
because there was no evidence the county intended to 
discriminate against any one class, a prerequisite for a 
disparate treatment claim.80  The court also rejected the 
plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim because they could not show 
the exam fell “more harshly upon them,” a prerequisite for a 
disparate impact claim.81  While the county expressly 
admitted it redesigned the test to diminish the adverse 
impact on black applicants, that desire “in and of itself” did 
not constitute evidence of discrimination.82  It would be a 
mistake to treat “racial motive as a synonym for a 
 
 74. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 
1608.1(b) (2010).  
 75. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620–21 (1987). 
 76. Id. at 642.  “[V]oluntary employer action can play a crucial role in 
furthering Title VII’s purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the 
workplace, and . . . Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts.”  Id. at 
630. 
 77. See Does Affirmative Action Punish Whites?, MSNBC.COM (Apr. 28, 
2009, 7:19:29 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30462129/ns/us_news-life; see 
also 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a).  
 78. See infra text accompanying notes 79–83. 
 79. See Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51–52 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 48. 
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constitutional violation.”83 
The Tenth Circuit rejected a similar Title VII claim by 
white male police officers, who complained that the police 
department’s expansion of those eligible to participate in an 
oral examination—which resulted in the addition of one 
Hispanic male, one Hispanic female, one Native American 
female, and three white males to the list of those eligible for 
promotion—discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis 
of race.84  The department generated the “Promotional List” 
using a two-stage competition among eligible officers: a 
written exam and an oral “Assessment Center” exam.85  Only 
those employees who achieved a certain score on the written 
exam advanced to the Assessment Center portion.86  The 
complaining officers qualified for the Assessment Center 
stage regardless of whether the department expanded the 
eligibility list or not.87  However, due to their Assessment 
Center scores, they failed to make the Promotional List.88  
The Tenth Circuit ruled that, assuming the department 
expanded the eligibility list solely because it wanted to 
include more women and minorities in the next stage, 
plaintiffs could not demonstrate denial of the opportunity to 
compete on an equal footing with minority candidates.89 
The circuit courts have thus protected employers from 
disparate treatment claims when they took reasonable steps 
to ensure all applicants competed on a level playing field.  In 
deciding Ricci, the Supreme Court continued to recognize 
voluntary compliance as “the preferred means of achieving 
the objectives of Title VII.”90  However, mere “good faith” fear 
of disparate impact liability will no longer be enough to 
justify such voluntary compliance if it violates the disparate 
treatment provision of Title VII.91 
 
 83. Id. at 49 (referring to plaintiffs’ additional equal protection claim). 
 84. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 85. Id. at 1273. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1277 (affirming the district court’s granting of summary judgment 
for the city). 
 90. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009) (quoting Local 
No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 
(1986)). 
 91. Id. at 2675. 
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II. THE RACIALLY DISPARATE IMPACT OF STANDARDIZED 
EXAMS 
While in existence now for nearly a century, standardized 
pre-employment testing experienced a huge spurt during 
World War II, as the U.S. military administered cognitive 
ability and intelligence testing when selecting personnel.92  
While the Civil Rights Act and the publishing of the Uniform 
Guidelines in the 1970s shed some doubt on the validity of 
pre-employment testing, by the late 1980s and 1990s, pre-
employment testing had made a comeback.93  That is because 
these tests are widely believed to be among the most valid 
predictors of job performance, regardless of the fact that they 
are associated with large performance differences between 
blacks and whites, as well as employers hiring 
proportionately fewer blacks than whites.94  The consequences 
of these policies leave individuals in certain ethnic groups 
with markedly lower levels of access to better employment 
opportunities.95 
It is generally accepted across disciplines to expect a 1.0 
standard deviation between black and white performance on 
standardized testing, no matter the discipline (i.e., education, 
military, employment, etc.).96  Without delving deeper into an 
examination of standard deviations, an employer planning to 
hire 25% of those passing a test resulting in a 1.0 standard 
deviation between whites and blacks might expect to hire or 
promote approximately 4.7% of the black applicants.97  
Compare that with a standard deviation of 0.9 and the same 
hiring ratio might result in a projected minority 
hiring/promotion rate of 5.8% of black applicants.98  Thus, the 
lower the standard deviation between races, the greater the 
likelihood such a selection method will produce a diverse 
workforce. 
 
 92. Carrigan, supra note 15, at 35, 37. 
 93. Id. at 37. 
 94. Philip L. Roth et. al., Ethnic Group Differences in Cognitive Ability in 
Employment and Educational Settings: A Metaanalysis, 54 PERSONNEL 
PSYCHOL. 297, 298 (2001). 
 95. Id. at 298. 
 96. The standard deviation for blacks is 0.99, 1.02, 1.34, 1.10, and 0.99 for 
the SAT, ACT, GRE, military tests and employment tests respectively.  Sackett, 
supra note 16, at 222. 
 97. Roth, supra note 94, at 300. 
 98. Id. 
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The effects of the standard deviation played a 
pronounced role in Ricci, where the fire department invited 
22% of those applying for the captain position to interview.99  
Twenty percent of those testing to become captain were black; 
however only 1% passed and none of them were ultimately 
selected to interview.100  The fire department invited 13% 
percent of those applying for the lieutenant promotion to 
interview.101  Twenty-five percent of those testing to become 
lieutenant were black, however less than 1% passed and none 
were invited to interview.102 
III. BACKGROUND OF RICCI V. DESTEFANO 
A. The Dispute 
In suing the city and those responsible for refusing to 
certify the 2003 fire department promotional test results, 
seventeen white candidates and one Hispanic candidate 
claimed the defendants intentionally discriminated against 
them in favor of nonwhite candidates because of political 
pressure exerted by the mayor, thereby violating Title VII’s 
disparate treatment provision.103  Defendants replied they 
only desired to avoid violating Title VII’s disparate impact 
provision and comply with the spirit of that law.104 
B. Administering the Exam 
In 2003, the New Haven Fire Department administered 
written and oral examinations for promotion to Lieutenant 
and Captain.105  Forty-one applicants took the Captain’s 
 
 99. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 150–51. 
 104. Id. at 152–53. 
 105. Id. at 145.  The city contracted with I/O Solutions (IOS), a company that 
specializes in these kinds of exams, to design the test.  Id.  The company first 
interviewed a random sample of current New Haven Fire Department 
Lieutenants, Captains, and Battalion Chiefs to determine the basic information 
concerning the structure of the department, the tasks required of individuals at 
each rank, and the materials the department generally utilizes for training.  Id. 
at 147.  Based on those interviews, IOS developed a written “job analysis 
questionnaire” (JAQ) that asked all incumbents in the positions for Lieutenant 
and Captain “to provide information about how important they feel a specific 
task, knowledge area, skill or ability is . . . . ”  Id.  The JAQ asked how 
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exam, of whom twenty-five were white, eight black, and eight 
Hispanic.106  Twenty-two of the applicants passed, of whom 
sixteen were white, three black, and three Hispanic.107  
However, because only nine individuals would be considered 
for the seven vacancies the city needed to fill, and the top 
nine scores came from seven whites and two Hispanics, the 
Fire Department did not consider any blacks for a captain 
position.108 
Seventy-seven applicants took the Lieutenant’s exam, of 
whom forty-three were white, nineteen black, and fifteen 
Hispanic.109  Thirty-four passed, of whom twenty-five were 
white, six black and three Hispanic.110  However, because only 
ten individuals would be considered for the eight lieutenant 
vacancies the city needed to fill, and the top ten scores came 
from ten whites, the Fire Department did not consider any 
blacks or Hispanics for promotion.111 
C. New Haven Assesses the Results 
New Haven’s Civil Service Board (CSB) held several 
hearings in 2004 before deciding whether to certify the 
results of the exam.112  Alarmed by the results, the city’s 
Corporate Counsel Thomas Ude characterized them to the 
CSB as demonstrating “a very significant disparate impact  
. . . .”113  He later testified that the results of previous exams 
in the department and in other departments had not 
produced this level of disparity, making these results 
 
important each task was to successful performance on the job and how 
frequently it was necessary to perform it.  Id.  The importance and frequency of 
a task were merged into a metric called “criticality or essentiality.”  Id.  Tasks 
above a certain threshold in this metric were designated for testing on the 
written and oral portions of the exam.  Id.  Upon completion, the test was 
assessed by two “independent reviewers,” neither of whom worked in the state.  
Id. 
 106. Id. at 145. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 145. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 145.  Interpreting the disparate impact statute for the CSB, Ude 
informed the board that, even if they believed the test was job-related, it could 
still be rejected if it had a disparate impact on a minorities and less 
discriminatory alternatives for selecting candidates for promotion existed.  Id. 
at 145–46. 
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“different” from results in the past.114 
While none of the firefighters knew where they placed on 
the exam, several testified before the CSB in favor and 
against certifying the results.115  Frank Ricci, the plaintiff in 
the subsequence case, spoke in favor of certifying the results, 
arguing that he studied eight to thirteen hours a day to 
prepare for the exam, incurring over $1000 in costs, including 
purchasing the books and paying an acquaintance to read 
them onto tape because he is dyslexic and learns better by 
listening.116  Another firefighter argued the test was fair since 
every question on it came from the materials applicants were 
instructed to study.117  Several firefighters argued against 
certifying the results, some on the ground that the questions 
“were not relevant to knowledge or skills necessary for the 
positions.”118  Another firefighter mentioned the study 
materials were difficult to obtain.119 
Donald Day, a representative of the Northeast Region of 
the International Association of Black Professional 
Firefighters, argued against certification on several 
grounds.120  First, black and Hispanic firefighters ranked 
sufficiently high to have a realistic opportunity for promotion 
on previous promotional examinations in 1996 and 1999.121  
Day also compared New Haven’s results with that of 
Bridgeport, Connecticut’s department, which had more 
diversity in its ranks.122 
Attempting to understand whether the test itself was 
flawed, the CSB heard testimony from Christopher Hornick, 
Ph.D., who runs a consulting business that competes with the 
company the city hired to generate the exam.123  While not 
referring to the test itself, Hornick testified that the results of 
 
 114. Id. at 150. 
 115. Id. at 146. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  For example, one question asked whether to park a fire truck facing 
“uptown” or “downtown,” terms that have no reference in New Haven.  Id. 
 119. Id.  The only books that fire houses kept on hand were the “Essentials to 
Fire Fighting” series, not the books included on the syllabus to be studied for 
the exam.  Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (referring specifically to the fact Bridgeport weighed the written 
portion of the exam significantly less than New Haven, 30% rather than 60%). 
 123. Id. at 148. 
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the exam exhibited “relatively high adverse impact.”124  He 
also told the committee that his company finds “significantly 
and dramatically less adverse impact” in most of the tests he 
designs.125  While whites normally outperform nonwhites on 
the majority of standardized testing procedures,126 the degree 
of adverse impact resulting from the New Haven tests 
“surprised” Hornick.127  When pressed to explain the 
disparity, Hornick referred to several characteristics of the 
exam that combined to produce the disparity.128  First, New 
Haven depended far more on the written portion of the exam 
than other departments.129  He also pointed to the fact that no 
one within the New Haven Fire Department reviewed the 
test, which typically results in questions that have scant 
relevance to the specific department tested.130  Yet, Hornick 
suggested the CSB should certify the results anyway.131 
Hornick also testified about alternatives to the exam New 
Haven employed.132  One alternative is an “assessment center 
process,” which is essentially an opportunity for candidates to 
demonstrate their knowledge of standard operating 
procedures, and how they would address a particular problem 
rather than verbally regurgitating it on a written exam.133  
Hornick testified that such “situation judgment tests,” once 
customized to particular organizations, “demonstrate 
dramatically less adverse impacts.”134  Such an approach has 
been endorsed in the past by the Tenth Circuit.135 
Finally, Dr. Janet Helms, a professor of counseling 
psychology and director of the Institute for the Study and 
Promotion of Race and Culture at Boston College, testified 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  Vincent Lewis, a Fire Program Specialist for the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, and a retired firefighter from Michigan, also testified to the 
CSB that, while the test asked relevant questions and he would not change a 
thing, the disparate impact was probably the result of a “general pattern that 
usually whites outperform [nonwhites] on testing.”  Id. at 149. 
 127. Id. at 148. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 148–49. 
 131. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2680 (2009). 
 132. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998); 
supra Part I.E. 
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generally about the differences in performance on 
standardized tests between whites and nonwhites.136  
According to Helms, experts know “for a fact” that, regardless 
of what kind of written test given in this country, they can 
just about predict how many people will pass who are 
members of “underrepresented groups.”137  In fact, the results 
in New Haven’s case were indicative of those predictions.138  
As for New Haven’s test, Helms suggested one problem might 
be that 67% of the respondents in the survey that determined 
which questions were relevant to the job were white, so the 
questions ultimately chosen may have skewed toward their 
job knowledge as “most of the literature on firefighters show 
that the different [racial and gender] groups perform the job 
differently.”139  Another reason for the difference could have 
resulted from disparities in opportunities for training and 
“informal mentoring” available to minorities.140  Helms 
testified that minority test takers often score lower because 
they are not expected to perform well.141  She also mentioned 
that minority test takers often deviate from the traditional 
methods of performing tasks.142  Finally, Helms believed that 
socioeconomic disparity infected the scores, most likely a 
result of requiring costly books to prepare for the exam.143 
D. District Court Grants Summary Judgment for City 
Applying the McDonnell Douglas three-prong burden-
shifting framework,144 District Court Judge Janet Bond 
 
 136. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  Under 
that test, plaintiffs first must establish a prima facie case of discrimination on 
account of race.  Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 151.  To do so, they must prove (1) 
membership in a protected class, (2) qualification for the position, (3) an adverse 
employment action, and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of membership in the protected class.  Id. at 151–52.  
This proof thus shifts the burden to the defendant to produce evidence that the 
plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.  Id. at 152.  
“This burden is one of production, not persuasion.”  Id. (quoting Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).  “It involves no 
credibility assessment.”  Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142).  Defendant’s 
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Arterton held that, since the city’s motivation when refusing 
to certify the results was a “good faith” attempt to comply 
with Title VII, it had no discriminatory intent, and thus the 
plaintiffs could not prevail on their Title VII claim.145 
Specifically, the District Court noted that the 
department’s test resulted in textbook disparate impact, 
citing the EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines.146  Under the 
Guidelines’ “four-fifths rule,” a selection that yields “a 
selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less 
than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the highest 
rate will generally be regarded by the federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact.”147  The four-fifths 
result would have been only 48% on the lieutenant’s exam, 
while on the captain’s exam it would have been even less, 
both far below the 80% threshold imposed by the EEOC.148 
E. Second Circuit Affirms District Court Decision 
In what became the most discussed circuit court opinion 
of 2008,149 the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
 
burden is satisfied if the proffered evidence, “taken as true, would permit the 
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.”  
Id. (quoting Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)).  If the 
employer articulates a neutral reason for the plaintiff’s termination, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext, or that the employer’s proffered 
explanation has no support.  Id. at 152. 
 145. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (granting defendant’s motion and denying 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment). 
 146. Id. at 153. 
 147. Id. (citing Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 
C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010)). 
 148. Id. at 153–54. 
 149. U.S. President Barack Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor from 
the Second Circuit to replace David Souter as Supreme Court Justice the year 
after Sotomayor served as part of the per curiam opinion affirming the District 
Court decision in Ricci.  See, e.g., EDITORIAL: A Judge Too Far; Nominating 
Sotomayor reveals the president’s true colors, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 27, 
2009, at A18, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2009/may/27/a-judge-too-far/ (“The Supreme Court is expected to rule on Ricci v. 
DeStefano before the Senate votes on Judge Sotomayor’s nomination.  It would 
be an extraordinary rebuke were a current nominee to be overruled on such a 
controversial case by the very justices she is slated to join.”).  Conservative 
members of the media and the U.S. Senate later used the fact the decision was 
reversed by the Supreme Court as evidence Judge Sotomayor was too extreme 
for a Supreme Court appointment, typically without mentioning the fact the 
case was reversed by a mere 5-4 margin.  See, e.g., Sarah Pavlus, Conservative 
Media Claim Supreme Court Decided Ricci “9-0” against Sotomayor, MEDIA 
MATTERS FOR AMERICA (June 29, 2009, 7:55 pm), 
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“well reasoned” opinion.150  More specifically, the Second 
Circuit ruled that, because the CSB was merely trying to 
fulfill its Title VII obligations when “confronted” with test 
results showing a disproportionate racial impact, its actions 
were justified.151 
IV. SUPREME COURT: EMPLOYER’S GOOD FAITH BELIEF IT 
WOULD SUFFER LITIGIOUS CONSEQUENCES NOT ENOUGH TO 
JUSTIFY TOSSING TEST RESULTS FOR ALL  
A. Reverses District Court Holding for City 
Reversing the Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme 
Court held that once the process by which promotions will be 
made has been established and employers have made their 
selection criteria clear, they may not then invalidate the test 
results absent “a strong basis in evidence” of an 
impermissible disparate impact.152 
Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court, per Justice 
Kennedy writing for a five-to-four majority, rejected the city’s 
contention that an employer’s “good-faith belief” that its 
actions are necessary to comply with Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision should be enough to justify “race-conscious 
conduct.”153  Justice Kennedy foresaw a parade of horribles 
resulting from such a principle, namely encouraging race-
based action at the slightest hint of disparate impact, thereby 
amounting to a “de facto quota system,” in which employers 
discard test results with the intent of obtaining the “preferred 
racial balance.”154 
 
 
http://mediamatters.org/research/200906290036; Anita Sinha & Daniel 
Farbman, Sotomayor, Ricci and the Preferential Treatment Myth, 
COMMONDREAMS.ORG, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/07/17-5 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2012) (“Republican senators on the Judiciary Committee have 
brought up the Ricci case everyday this week during Sotomayor’s confirmation 
hearings, and called on Mr. Ricci to testify yesterday against Judge Sotomayor.  
Their argument seems to be: Sotomayor has been a beneficiary of unfair 
preference over [w]hite men like Mr. Ricci, and she will continue to prefer 
people like her (i.e.[,] people of color) over [w]hites from her seat on the 
Supreme Court.”). 
 150. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009). 
 153. Id. at 2674–75. 
 154. Id. at 2675. 
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The Court also rejected Ricci’s contentions that avoiding 
disparate impact lawsuits never justifies throwing out test 
results, or that an employer must already be in violation of 
Title VII in order take such an action.155 
B. Reintroduces the Strong Basis in Evidence Standard 
In determining a standard that “strikes a more 
appropriate balance” between the city’s and Ricci’s 
arguments, the Court settled on a “strong basis in evidence” 
standard, borrowing from its Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection jurisprudence.156  The Court has held in equal 
protection cases such as Wygant v. Jackon Board of 
Education and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., that certain 
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination, 
which are themselves based on race, are constitutional only 
where there is a “strong basis in evidence” that the remedial 
objectives are necessary.157  The majority ruled this standard 
will limit an employer’s discretion to cases in which there is a 
strong basis in evidence of disparate impact liability, while 
allowing employers to act only where there is a provable, 
actual violation.158 
Title VII permits an employer who wants to consider, 
before administering a test or practice, how to design that 
test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all 
individuals, regardless of race.159  However, once the 
promotion process has been established and employers have 
made their selection criteria clear, they may not then 
invalidate the test results absent a strong basis in evidence of 
an impermissible disparate impact.160 
The Court agreed with the district court that the city had 
a prima facie case of disparate impact on its hands.161  The 
Supreme Court held, however, that anyone who brought a 
disparate impact claim in this case would not be able to prove 
the exams were not job related and consistent with business 
 
 155. Id. at 2674. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 2675 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
500 (1989)); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986). 
 158. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2676. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2677. 
 161. Id. at 2677–78. 
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necessity, or that there existed an equally valid, less 
discriminatory alternative that served the city’s needs but 
that the city refused to adopt.162  In doing so, the Court gave 
little, if any, credence to the testimony of Dr. Hornick 
concerning the adverse impact of the results and how another 
test might change that.163  It treated Dr. Helms’s testimony 
about how the test may have been deficient with similar 
disinterest.164 
But “[t]he Supreme Court did not provide detailed 
guidance as to how the strong basis in evidence standard 
should be applied.”165  Since the Court’s Ricci decision, the 
Second Circuit has taken the most explicit approach in 
outlining the Court’s “strong basis in evidence” standard, 
holding that a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact 
liability is “an objectively reasonable basis to fear such 
liability.”166  Elaborating on this standard, the Second Circuit 
held that the employer’s decision, evaluated at the time an 
employer takes a race-conscious action, must rely “on real 
evidence, not just subjective fear or speculation.”167  The court 
will uphold such a decision so long as there exists “actual 
proof of a prima facie case” of disparate impact, and 
“objectively strong evidence of non-job-relatedness or a less 
discriminatory alternative.”168 
While the city’s demonstration of less discriminatory 
alternatives was arguably not objectively strong, this 
standard introduced by the Second Circuit appears nowhere 
in the statute as written by Congress.169  Title VII requires an 
 
 162. Id. at 2678 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (C) (2010)). 
 163. Id. at 2680; see supra Part III.C. 
 164. See Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2681; Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. 
Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D. Conn. 2006); supra Part III.C. 
 165. NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 707 F. Supp. 2d 520, 532–33 
(D.N.J. 2010). 
 166. United States v. Brennan, No. 08-5171-CV(L), 2011 WL 1679850, at *37 
(2d Cir. May 5, 2011) (emphasis in the original).  The Second Circuit goes even 
further than Ricci, holding the employer must also have a strong basis in 
evidence that, at the remedial stage following a finding of liability, a court 
would impose a remedy “equivalent to or broader than what the employer has 
done voluntarily.”  Id. at *34.  
 167. Id. at *37. 
 168. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2010); see also NAACP, 707 F. Supp. 
2d at 532–33 (applying the Ricci standard to job relatedness and business 
necessity without adding the phrase “objectively strong” to the test); supra Part 
I.E. 
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employer, in response to a claim of disparate impact, only to 
“demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.”170  Therefore, the “objectively strong” qualifier can 
be supported only by the Supreme Court’s “strong basis in 
evidence” standard, which itself is found nowhere in Title VII. 
 
V. PROBLEM: REFUSING TO APPRECIATE THE DISPARATE 
EFFECTS OF STANDARDIZED TESTING EXACERBATES THE 
CONSEQUENCES 
To understand why the city of New Haven could find the 
tests it used unrelated to job performance, as well as why it 
favored an alternative such as an assessment center 
approach, one must fully appreciate the racial disparity 
exhibited by standardized testing and how assessment 
centers close the gap.171  The Supreme Court never fully 
investigated this phenomenon once it dismissed Dr. Hornick’s 
testimony concerning alternative approaches as tinged with a 
competitive agenda,172 and Dr. Helms’ testimony tinged with 
professional indifference, as she had not even analyzed the 
test itself.173 
Despite such a poor demonstration by the city, a more 
thorough analysis of standardized testing calls for a different 
approach than a “strong basis in evidence” standard, 
especially in light of how these tests adversely impact racial 
minorities as compared to viable alternatives.  Ignoring the 
racial disparity resulting from standardized employment 
tests, the Court exacerbates the divide.  Unless Congress acts, 
 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2010). 
 171. Indeed, the Supreme Court failed to do this in any substantive way. 
However, neither did the city.  While the city called several witnesses to testify 
at its hearings considering whether to certify the results, the only witness 
discussing an alternative approach ran a consulting business that competed 
with the company hired by the city.  Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 
2658, 2680 (2009).  Further, the only witness discussing the statistical racial 
disparity admitted before testifying she did not even look at the test itself.  Id. 
at 2681.  Therefore, if the Supreme Court did not hit disparate impact out of the 
park, it is not for lack of a proverbial softball lobbed to it by the New Haven 
Civil Service Board. 
 172. Id. at 2680 (“Hornick’s primary concern-somewhat to the frustration of 
CSB members-was marketing his services for the future, not commenting on the 
results of the tests the City had already administered.”). 
 173. See id. at 2681. 
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the consequences of racial disparity in test scores will 
inevitably increase as generations of individuals within those 
racial groups grow up in households in which it is more 
challenging to obtain gainful employment. 
VI. WHY WHITES OUTPERFORM MINORITIES ON 
STANDARDIZED TESTS AND HOW ALTERNATIVES CAN AVOID 
THE PROBLEM 
A. Reasons for the Racial Disparity of Exam Results 
There are several reasons minorities perform differently 
on standardized tests.174  Preparing for and taking 
standardized tests begins in grade school.175  However, 
research demonstrates that two-thirds of black and 70% of 
Hispanic schoolchildren attend what are in essence de facto 
segregated schools.176  In fact, the percentage of black 
children now enrolled in integrated public schools is at its 
lowest level since 1968,177 and racial segregation in American 
public schools is particularly pronounced in the northeast 
(where New Haven is located) and midwest sections of the 
country.178  Such segregation in schools is associated with 
high levels of poverty which, in turn, are associated with poor 
resources and decreased educational opportunities.179  As a 
rule, the poorest schools are the ones with the highest 
 
 174. See infra Part VI.A. 
 175. Alfie Kohn, Standardized Testing and Its Victims, EDUC. WK., Sept. 27, 
2000, at 60. 
 176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  By “de 
facto segregation,” I mean that the schools have become or remain segregated 
not as a result of laws facially designed to keep populations racially distinct, but 
effectually so. 
 177. Sarah Karnasiewicz, Apartheid America: Jonathan Kozol Rails Against 
a Public School System That, 50 Years After Brown v. Board of Education, is 
Still Deeply – and Shamefully – Segregated, SALON.COM (Sept. 22, 2005, 12:22 
AM), http://www.salon.com/life/feature/2005/09/22/kozol. 
 178. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 857.  Segregation in the schools has been 
shown to have a relationship with segregation in housing.  See, e.g., Manny 
Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities In Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2007, at A20 (finding that home buyers in predominantly black and Hispanic 
neighborhoods in New York City were more likely to get their mortgages in 
2006 from a subprime lender, subjecting them to higher interest and penalties 
than home buyers in white neighborhoods with similar income levels).  Such 
segregation is the result of several housing discrimination phenomena such as 
“red lining,” in which banks discriminate against black applicants for mortgages 
by denying access or increasing the costs.  Id. 
 179. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 857. 
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minority population.180  If de facto public school segregation 
was the only factor working against them, minority 
applicants for promotion in the New Haven Fire Department 
would not be expected to perform well on the standardized 
exams.  But it is not.  Further, such a factor would not 
explain the disparity of results among black applicants from 
integrated or relatively high quality schools. 
There are other reasons.  Dr. Helms alluded, in her 
testimony to the CSB, that the questions for these exams are 
typically written by white people and tested on them before 
official use.181  Meanwhile, inner-city segregation has led to 
the creation and use of a “Black English Vernacular,” making 
it extremely difficult for blacks who use it regularly to easily 
transition between standard English school work and books 
to the Black-English Vernacular that they use in their homes 
and with their friends.182  So long as employers use language 
as a screening device for jobs, such as in standardized tests 
written by whites using Standard American English, there 
will be serious obstacles to minority applicants looking to 
advance in the New Haven Fire Department and 
elsewhere.183  While this might explain the score disparity for 
many students, it still would not explain the disparity for 
black students raised in homes or neighborhoods where they 
do not speak using a different vernacular. 
Various other reasons account for the test score disparity 
that Dr. Helms referred to, such as the fact that mentoring 
opportunities in organizations like fire departments are more 
easily available to whites because whites already hold those 
positions.184  Also, the differences between how whites and 
blacks might perform a specific task would result in different 
answers on an exam.185 
 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 156 (D. Conn. 2006) 
(“[A]pproximately [two-thirds] of those interviewed [to assess the exam] were 
white [which] could have unintentionally introduced a bias into the test 
instrument.”). 
 182. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 163–64 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1998). 
 183. Id. at 165. 
 184. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149. 
 185. Id. 
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But one phenomenon that has typified minority 
performance on standardized exams, and one Dr. Helms 
referred to in her testimony,186 is known as “stereotype 
threat,” the impact of one’s consciousness of her race, gender, 
etc., when taking a standardized exam on which she is not 
expected to successfully perform.187  For example, research 
conducted in the 1960s found that black participants 
performed better on IQ tests when administrators presented 
the exams as tests of eye-hand coordination rather than tests 
of intelligence, since participants considered the former a 
“nonevaluative” and thus a non-threatening test.188  A similar 
test found that black students performed better on IQ tests 
when they believed their performance would be compared to 
other blacks as opposed to whites.189 
Claude Steele coined the term “stereotype threat” in 1995 
after conducting a study where he administered the Graduate 
Record Examination (GRE) to white and black students.190  
Researchers told one half of each racial group the test 
measured “intellectual ability,” while telling the other half it 
measured “problem-solving” tasks nondiagnostic of ability.191  
The white students demonstrated no difference in 
performance between the two groups, but blacks from the 
“intelligence” group performed far worse than the other 
group.192  The end result: stereotype threat conditions impair 
standardized test performance among the people who are 
 
 186. Id. (“[T]est takers may score lower if they are expected not to perform 
well . . . .”). 
 187. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the 
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995) (“Our reasoning is this: whenever African American 
students perform an explicitly scholastic or intellectual task, they face the 
threat of confirming or being judged by a negative societal stereotype—a 
suspicion—about their group’s intellectual ability and competence.  This threat 
is not borne by people not stereotyped in this way.  And the self-threat it 
causes—through a variety of mechanisms—may interfere with the intellectual 
functioning of these students, particularly during standardized tests.”). 
 188. Irwin Katz et al., Effects of Task Difficulty, Race of Administrator, and 
Instructions on Digit-Symbol Performance of Negroes, 2 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (1965). 
 189. Irwin Katz, Effect upon Negro Digit Symbol Performance of Comparison 
with Whites and with Other Negroes, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 77, 77 
(1964). 
 190. See Steele & Anderson, supra note 187, at 799. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 801. 
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subject to negative stereotyping.193  This phenomenon would 
explain racial disparity across cultural subgroups of one race 
or gender since it relies not on one’s upbringing or 
environment, but rather on one’s identity.194 
B. Assessment Centers as an Alternative Approach 
When New Haven considered whether to throw out its 
2003 standardized test results, Dr. Hornick testified that “we 
know that” written tests are not as valid as other 
procedures.195  Besides the racial disparity of standardized 
test results, there is also the real danger that departments 
could place the wrong individuals into positions in which they 
dictate the outcomes of significant life or death situations.196  
Hornick suggested an “assessment center” as one example of 
a test that would produce a less disparate impact.197  Fire 
departments and police departments have turned to 
alternatives such as assessment center testing because of a 
history of hiring individuals that may perform well on 
standardized tests but “couldn’t lead themselves out of [a] 
building, let alone lead men and women toward 
accomplishing organizational objectives.”198  An assessment 
center is a testing process in which candidates participate in 
a series of systematic, job related, real-life situations while 
being observed and evaluated by experts in their field.199  
Assessors observe candidates individually and in groups 
performing exercises or scenarios that simulate conditions 
and situations they would encounter in real life.200  For 
example, one part of the El Paso Fire Department’s exam is 
called the “Incident Scenario,” which examines one’s ability to 
command and control an emergency scene.201  The applicant 
 
 193. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat Does Not Live by 
Steele and Aronson (1995) Alone, 59 AM. PSYCH. 47, 48 (2004). 
 194. See generally supra note 188. 
 195. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 148 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 196. See Larry F. Jetmore, Assessment Center Promotional Testing, 
POLICEONE.COM, http://www.policeone.com/police-jobs/articles/2083870-
Assessment-center-promotional-testing (last accessed Feb. 26, 2012). 
 197. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149. 
 198. Jetmore, supra note 196. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Achieving Success Through the Promotional Process: An Introduction to 
the Fire Service Assessment Center Process, Slideshow Presentation of the El 
Paso Fire Department (2008), http://www.ci.el-paso.tx.us/fire/_documents 
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presents the scenario to four assessors, discussing and 
justifying her actions and decisions.202 
Many conclude the assessment center method most 
closely approximates real-life behavior because it focuses on 
relevant job-related simulations.203  In just about every 
profession, there are some individuals who grasp the esoteric 
knowledge of the business, and others who manifest a 
supreme ability to practice it, and they are not always the 
same people.204  Relying on a standardized test for fire or 
police department promotions merely exacerbates the life or 
death consequences of such a practice.  While one might know 
whether to park the truck “uptown or downtown,” that does 
not mean that she knows—looking up at a building full of 
smoke, but short on exits—the fastest way to carry one’s 
family to safety.205  Conversely, an assessment center test 
measures a candidate’s capability to impact and influence 
others, resolve conflict situations, project professional 
proficiency during task performance, demonstrate inherent 
and learned leadership skills, and project one’s leadership 
style authoritatively.206 
Further, those departments employing assessment center 
tests without resorting to a racially adverse method of 
selecting those who they ultimately promote from the results 
see a dearth of litigious challenges.207  While it is difficult to 
settle on one reason for this, it is likely because participants 
 
/An%20Introduction%20To%20The%20Fire%20Service%20Assessment%20Cent
er.pdf (“You are Battalion Chief on B7.  P41 arrives on scene and reports heavy 
smoke and fire involving two mobile home residential structures.  They indicate 
that they are making an initial ‘quick attack’ on the Division B structure.  You 
are second on the scene and observe two structures fully involved with 
occupants and neighbors frantically helping P41.  Residential structures on 
Divisions B and D are being exposed to heat, fire and smoke.”). 
 202. Id. 
 203. JOHN L. COLEMAN, POLICE ASSESSMENT TESTING: AN ASSESSMENT 
CENTER HANDBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (4th ed. 2010). 
 204. See id. at 8 (“Most police officers can identify an acquaintance who 
appears to possess a superior intelligence or knowledge level but can’t seem to 
translate that know-how into performance as a supervisor.”). 
 205. See id. at 7 (“Organizational police management is beginning to realize 
that its most performance-skilled or productive workers will not always be the 
better person to promote into a leadership position.  The value of the 
assessment process is that it takes these employees and placed them in an 
actual work-simulated situation to test their performance.”). 
 206. Id. at 14. 
 207. Id. at 35. 
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recognize that the assessment center provides a fair 
opportunity to demonstrate their skills and abilities.208  In 
addition, participants accept the process as fair and relevant 
because each person performs in situations similar to those 
they will actually confront when promoted.209 
VII.  PROPOSAL: CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND TITLE VII 
Standardized testing pervades nearly every walk of life 
and serves as a litmus test for obtaining gainful employment, 
among many other pursuits.210  Naturally, mechanically 
applying standardized test results to a diverse group of 
applicants whose scores reflect culturally inherent score 
variations will have the result, intended or not, of favoring 
some races over others.  Therefore, if Congress still embraces 
the purpose of Title VII it expounded when passing the 1991 
amendment to the Civil Rights Act,211 it should amend Title 
VII, adopting the following language: 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate 
impact is established where (a) a complaining party 
demonstrates that an employer certifies the results of a 
particular test or examination that causes a disparate 
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, and (b) such results can reasonably be assumed 
to follow from the discriminatory effects of the creation or 
administration of the exam, or (c) the employer is aware, 
or should be aware, of reasonable alternative(s) to that 
test or examination that would produce less disparate 
results. 
A. Certifying the Results 
The administration of a promotional exam like the one in 
Ricci follows a definable order: (Step 1) research how the 
exam will be administered; (Step 2) create the exam; (Step 3) 
determine how it will be graded or weighted; (Step 4) 
determine how many promotions are available; (Step 5) issue 
the requirements or instructions for the exam to those 
 
 208. Id. at 7. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Mike Littwin, GOP Sympathy Card: Jack of Hypocrisy, 
DENVERPOST.COM (July 17, 2009, 1:00AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
littwin/ci_12856807; see also Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in 
“General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1991). 
 211. See supra Part I.E. 
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interested in applying; (Step 6) administer the exam; (Step 7) 
analyze the results; (Step 8) certify the results; (Step 9) use 
the results to award promotions.212 
While the Supreme Court in Ricci took exception to the 
fact that the city’s actions to adjust the outcome of the exam 
occurred after its administration,213 this contradicted previous 
federal decisions.  Circuit and district courts have 
consistently upheld the actions of cities to change the test 
before its administration in order to accommodate minority 
applicants (Step 2).214  The Supreme Court itself upheld the 
action of the Santa Clara County Transportation Authority 
when it circumvented its own test results to promote a female 
road dispatcher over a male one with a higher score (Step 
9).215  This is the latest in the process a city could intervene in 
order to ensure equal hiring opportunities, but the Supreme 
Court upheld the action as consistent with the Court’s 
agreement that Congress preferred employers to self-regulate 
under Title VII.216  As the Court observed then, it would be 
“ironic indeed” if a law triggered by the need to address the 
country’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and 
intended to improve the lot of those who suffered as a result, 
was subsequently used to prohibit voluntary, race-conscious 
efforts to address it.217 
By imposing the “strong basis in evidence” standard on 
employers who attempt to do exactly that, however,218 the 
Supreme Court clearly no longer fears such an irony.  
Therefore, Congress should amend the statute via clause (a) 
 
 212. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 
2006). 
 213. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009). 
 214. See, e.g., Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 50–51 (1999) 
(“[D]esigning the police officers’ entrance exam to mitigate the negative impact 
on minority candidates . . . does not demonstrate that the County designed the  
. . . exam because of some desire to adversely affect [white and Latino 
applicants].”); see also Carrabus v. Schneider, 119 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that designing exam to generate higher numbers of 
minority candidates in the top levels of grading lists insufficient to establish 
county was motivated by a desire to adversely affect white applicants). 
 215. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987). 
 216. Id. at 630 (“[V]oluntary employer action can play a crucial role in 
furthering Title VII’s purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the 
workplace, and . . .  Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts.”). 
 217. Id. at 645 (quoting Local No. 93 Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 516 (1986)). 
 218. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
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in order to clarify that employers may intervene even when 
tests have already been administered if the result of such an 
action treats all applicants similarly, i.e., that the results not 
certified are the results of all applicants, not just the test 
results of one race.  It is a contradiction to allow employers to 
alter how test results will be interpreted or scored so that 
more minority candidates may be promoted, but not allow 
them to refuse certifying the results when such an action 
poses a less discriminatory effect, such as when the results of 
all applicants are discarded.  Clause (a) protects such non-
discriminatory post-exam actions taken by employers to 
ensure fair administration of its promotional procedures. 
B. A Presumption of Discrimination 
Clause (b) of the new statute is intended to send a 
message to the Court that its “strong basis in evidence” 
standard circumvents the intent of Congress when it passed 
the 1991 revisions to the Civil Rights Act.  If Congress had 
desired such a strict plaintiff’s burden for proving disparate 
impact when it passed the 1991 amendment, it could have 
done so, instead of embracing the Griggs reasoning and thus 
placing the burden on the employer of demonstrating 
“business necessity” and “job relatedness.”219  Clause (b) is 
also more consistent with the EEOC’s own guidelines, which 
warn employers that disparate impact plaintiffs may prove a 
prima facie case of discrimination via the certification of test 
results demonstrating a violation of its four-fifths rule.220  A 
“strong basis in evidence” standard does not just circumvent 
this presumption but places the employer in a position of 
uncertainty.  While the four-fifths rule is quite simple to 
apply, the Court made no effort to describe exactly what a 
strong basis in evidence is, let alone how to apply it.221 
C. Responsibility to Utilize Reasonable Alternatives 
Finally, clause (c) clarifies the evidence of a reasonable 
alternative required to demonstrate disparate impact.  As 
previously noted, the city in Ricci stood as somewhat of a 
 
 219. See supra Part I.E. 
 220. See supra Part I.D. 
 221. See generally Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2675–81 (introducing the “strong 
basis in evidence” standard and ruling the City of New Haven did not meet it 
without ever suggesting steps it could have taken to do so). 
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straw man for the Court since it did not put forth the best 
possible case, especially when it came to researching a 
reasonable alternative to standardized testing.222  The 
majority dismissed this part of the city’s argument, especially 
when it came to the administration of an assessment center 
approach.223  The Court noted that Dr. Hornick’s “brief 
mention of alternative testing methods, standing alone, does 
not [demonstrate] assessment centers were available to the 
city at the time of the examinations and that they would have 
produced a less adverse impact.”224 
While the Court may quickly dispatch the city’s less than 
exemplary showing of reasonable alternatives, clause (c) 
allows a complainant, or an employer taking a proactive 
approach, to demonstrate such alternatives do exist with a 
reasonable amount of evidence.  For example, one would need 
to demonstrate that neighboring employers experience less 
disparate results based on a different, although well-known 
employment exam that is equally valid.  This way, the burden 
of production demonstrating such alternatives does not 
become one where parties need demonstrate overwhelming 
proof of less adverse impact, or no adverse impact of 
alternative tests.  Both of those standards would make it so 
difficult for disparate impact plaintiffs, few would survive 
summary judgment, despite the fact they bring otherwise 
strong cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Ricci, the Court has continued its assault on Title 
VII disparate impact.  Its rationale in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes225 may further blockade the courthouse door from 
disparate impact claimants, at least in the class action 
context.  The Court concluded that female employees failed to 
establish the existence of a common question to certify its 
class claiming sex discrimination at Wal-Mart.226  The Court 
held that such claims may only proceed to trial by 
 
 222. See supra Part V.A; supra note 142. 
 223. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2680. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 226. Id. at 2552.  In order to certify a class of plaintiffs under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, there must be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
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demonstrating “some glue” holding together the alleged 
reasons for the employer’s various decisions to hire or not 
hire, or promote or not promote all the class members.227 
Depending on where the Court demands to see the “glue” 
it mentions, it could decide that plaintiffs could not attack a 
standardized employment exam as a class because they could 
not demonstrate each individual’s performance on the exam 
was the result of stereotype threat, or some other cause 
common to the entire class.  In that case, the Court could 
decide that individual assessments of test performance will 
outweigh the benefits of class treatment. 
While the Court held that employees “clearly would 
satisfy” the commonality and typicality requirements for class 
actions under the Federal Rules by demonstrating that 
employers use a biased testing procedure,228 it also expressed 
deep skepticism for the “social framework” research of 
plaintiff’s sociological expert, Dr. William Bielby, who 
testified that Wal-Mart had a “strong corporate culture” 
making it vulnerable to gender bias.229  Because Dr. Bielby 
could not specify how regularly stereotypes played a 
meaningful role in employment decisions at Wal-Mart, the 
Court could “safely disregard what he ha[d] to say.”230 
This treatment of Dr. Bielby’s research bore a striking 
resemblance to the majority’s treatment of Dr. Helms in 
Ricci,231 in that the Court simply dismissed the findings so it 
never needed to appreciate the sociological consequences of 
them in light of its later decision.  It is difficult to see how a 
plaintiff’s expert explaining stereotype threat to the Court 
would fair any better. 
Ricci v. DeStefano is not the first time the Supreme Court 
attempted to circumvent the obvious intent of Title VII.232  
Such end runs around the statute have in the past been met 
with legislative rebuke.233  If Congress still wants to protect 
“flexibility in modifying employment systems and practices to 
 
 227. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552. 
 228. Id. at 2553 (quoting the Court’s decision in Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 229. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553. 
 230. Id. at 2554. 
 231. See supra Part V.B. 
 232. See supra Part I.D. 
 233. See supra Part I.E. 
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comport with the purposes of [T]itle VII,”234 and encourage 
and protect voluntary action to improve opportunities for 
minorities “in order to carry out the Congressional intent 
embodied in [T]itle VII,”235 then the time has come to clarify 
Title VII once again. 
Congress should amend the statute, making it an 
unlawful employment practice to certify the results of a test 
that causes a disparate impact when those results reasonably 
follow from the discriminatory effects of the creation or 
administration of the exam, or the employer is aware, or 
should be aware, of a reasonable alternative to the test that 
produces less disparate results. 
 
 
 234. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (2010). 
 235. Id. 
